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THE RELATIONS BZWlBZi IFERMAL BND EXTERNAL POLITICS 
m SWAZxm AND m m m  m m MID-1ym CENTDRY 
The reip af Mswati II (1838-65) is notable in Swazi h i s t o r y  both 
because it W d u r h g  t h i s  period that the morphow body of 
heterogeneous clam gathered together by Sobuza W properly 
amalgamated into a self-conscious and self-perpetuating nation, and 
because it was in t h e  course of M s  reim that the full *act of 
white penetration i n t o  South-East Africa was fully felt in Swaziland 
and the earliest of a series of decisions wese taken which were to 
govern W i  responsea to white encmachmenta f o r  -he rest of the 
century. Theae two processes, the one internal and the other 
external, were indissolubly lhked. 
"The -peas Factorfv became an important consideration in 
S w i  politics with the miml of the  Vooxtre&kem in flatal. in 
1836, but it was only with the eatablidmen-t of the Ohrigstad 
settlement in the Eastern Thnsvazd in 1845 that European penetration 
of South-East Africa exerted amy significant and sustained influence 
either on the processes of i n t e d  politics in S w a z i L d  or on the 
fomulat ion of its e x t e n d  policie~, h the event, the establishment 
of the O h r i g s t d  settlement in the winter of 1845 cobcided with a 
period of serious internal unrest in Swaziland, with the result that 
the u l t b a t e  impact of white penetration was mmy times magnified. 
When S o h a  had died in 1898 he had le f t  be- h5m 
only a v e q  precarious and fragile among the heterogeneous 
groups whom he had ruled. Very soon two distinct types af opposition 
to the legitimate leadership emerged, along t w o  entirely 
different planes of 5wazi society. On the one hand, the young Icing 
was faced w i t h  the competing ambitions of his inmunedle elder 
brothers, eeveral. of whom wished to supplant him, while, on the 
other hand, he found his authority being undermiaed by the 
persistent pressure of m af the "Am&azambilef1 chiefs t o  dilute, 
or even to *ssolve, the ties that bound them to their  D l m i n i  
overlomls. (1) Fortunately, t h e  interests of the one p u p  of 
opponents did not often coincide with those of t h e  other, and the 
Legitjmate leademhip could usual ly  r e l y  on those who opposed them 
in one situation to assist it against opposition in another. This, 
however, was  not always so, and. when the two types of opposition 
did coincide and intereata coalesced a si-hation of extreme $ravity 
waa created. 
Such was %he case with the rebellion of Fokoti, which took 
place probably witkdn a y e a  of S o h a !  s death. (2) Fokoti, who was 
an elder brother of & d i ,  launched his challenge fmm a regional 
power base in the south of b i l a n d .  (3) Forbnately f o r  Mswati, 
his other important brothers saw Fokoti as a greater challenge to 
their  respective posi t ions  +a the more easily manipulable '%herd 
boy kingft, and together w i t h  genuimekg le@timist elements quashed 
th i s  threat to his  succession. (4) The p r h e  comequence of W s  
rebellion was b t  it highlighted in an unmistakable fashion a 
number of -he  more important deficiencies in the admkistration ad. 
polit ical ,  s t r u c h  of the Dl=rmqni. hegemony, ~ 5 t h  the result that 
measures were soon taken, spurred on by Mswatils mother, X a n d z i ,  to 
mnedy, or at least minimize, the worst  of these. ( 5 )  The military 
system W c h  had reached its apogee in M a r s  Z u l d a n d ,  and which 
had hitherto been only p d i a l l g  operative in Sobuzals Swazilasla, 
was adopted in a rather more comprehensive =er. Nation wide 
agreements were formed a d  provided the framework of m i l i t q  
orgm&aa%ion, while a far more comprehensive sy~tem of royal villages 
was established, both as d l y h g  points for regzhents and also for 
the purpose of monitoring a d  supervising local activities. (6) 
Such measures were obviously inimical t o  the vested 
i.n+erests of many of the subordinate chiefs in S m i l a n d  &to had 
enjoyed a fairly large measure of autonoq in Sobuzat B time. (7) As 
a result, widespread discontent ensued, which finally reached its 
climax after an attack by Mshf~t t i  on a chief south of the Nkondo. ( 8 )  
According t o  Allison, a Wesleyan missionary who was active in 
Swaziland at th is  time, the chiefs thseatened to regard any M k e r  
attack on one of the i r  number as done to themselves as a mug, and 
to aict accordingly. (g) This caused n e a t  consternation among the 
advisers, who made imnediate concessions and thus averted the 
crisis which A l l i s o n  P e l t  to be imminent. 
Superimposed on this p i c k  of "ch ie f ly~hopos i t ion  t o  
c e n t d i z i n g  policies can also be detected the g r o w i n g  conflict 
w i t h i n  the myal house wrhich no doubt, in i t se l f ,  p k q e d  a 
si&ficant role in inducing the loca l  chiefs to be so f o r t h r i g h t  in 
thei r  opposition t o  Hswatils actions. All the evidence that we 
possess f o r  this period suggests that, even at this stage, Mswat i  was 
very far frxrm being maater of hia own house. He had been f e d l y  
imstalled as King in 1839 as a consequence of Fokotir S rebellion (10) , 
but as he was st i l l  young and immature the handling of affairs seems 
to have continued to remain in the hands of his fomer regents. Thus, 
when Allison visited bwati in 1844, he could not speak officially 
with him as Mswati waa as yet u n c i m c i s e d  and therefore unfit to 
conduct public dfafm.  (11) Siailazly, the whole tenor of Allisonls 
account of the events of MS period suggests that T a d l l e ,  m b u l e ,  
Somquba and Malun~e ,', %%her bwati, were the figures im control of 
mmta. (12) hdeed, even in July 1846, after t h e  departure f r o m  
the royal council of the powerful Malambule, and some time after 
Mswatfls circumcision, Somquba, fiwatits eldeat brother, was s t i l l  
desigmted in a trea* of cession between the b i  and the 0hr:igsta.d 
Boers as %uling in place of the -l1, while W n t i  merely figured 
as "captabW. (13) 
None the less, Mswati's circumcision, Which took place some 
t h e  in 1845, doea undoubtedly mask %he beghnhg of f iwat i?  e 
assumption of the rujll powers of H q s h i p ,  am2 it is fmm this date 
that relations between him and his bmther T4hlambule, hi therto one 
of his principal regents, began to deteriorate dramatically. 
Accounts differ as t o  the precise sequence of the events leading up 
to the final confrontation. me t r a d i t i o n a l .  ~ e r s i o n  of them is that 
hostilities started after mti uncovered a p l o t  of b l a m b u l e ~ s  t o  
kill him durhg a hunt. (14) Other sources relate that they a m s e  
out of W a m b u l e b  s h a f  to m e n d e r  cattle t o  Nswati. (15) But 
in either case the simficamce 18 mch the aame, viz. that Malambule 
was beghming to find the increaae k the young king 's  authority 
intolerable. 
k the early stages of the period of open c o n f m t a t i o n  
between Wambule and Nmati, MalambuLe pmempted much of the 
ground f o r  driplomatic manoeuvre a-railable to Mstrati. He not only 
wquired the backing of Npande, 4& Zulu W ,  but he even managed 
t o  manoeuvre the miseionary Allison i n t o  supporting his cause. (16) 
A l l  this, in view of the disaffection of the  subo-te chiefs 
which had short ly  preceded these events, coneti-lxtecl a situation of  
extreme peril for M a w a t i  and his followers, fox now there existed 
+he very real poss ib i l i t y  that Nalambule, at the head of a 
victorious Zulu amy, would be installed in Swaziland in Mswatits 
place. 
But Malambule did overlook one new power which kad only 
just made i ts  appe-e in this azea, and which had not as yet 
made any appreciable -act on the politics of the region, !MS was 
the settlement of the Ohrigstad kers which was established to the 
north of Swazi1a.d in A-t 1845. For Ikwati, the a p p e m c e  of 
this n e w  power was an unlooked f o ~  piece of good fortune, and &oat  
a t r a i & t  away attempts wse made by the royal pa* to obtain its 
support and co-operation. InitialLy, t h e i r  succesa was limited. 
At that time the Swazi could offer the O h r i g s t a d  connuunity 
authorities (then effectively under the control of the K o m t  
General, A. H. ~o tg5e te r )  n o w  t o  compensate them for becoming; 
embroiled in local disputes. Although the S w a z i  had some claim t o  
the land on &ich the Qhrigstad community had settled, am3 were 
probably prepared t o  come to some mutually satisfactory agreement 
involving this, Fotgieter, the b m a n b n t  Gene&, had already 
concluded an apeement w i + h  Selrwati, the Pedi chief who had 
apparently ceded the land to Potgieter in r e h  for pmtection 
against attacks by the Swazi. (17) To obtain i t s  cession from the 
Swazi was itherefore superfluous, and would merely nullify the 
agreement with SekwaSi f o r  the dubious benefit of protecting the 
Swaz;i against the Zulu. 
Equally. h p o r t a n t  was the fact that the S e h t i  agreement 
was one of the principal strengths of Potgietexle position as leader 
of the Ohrigstad c-ty (18) at a t h e  when t h i s  w a s  being 
increasingly challenged by his opponents w i t -  that community, (19) 
The q-l between Potgieter and his opponents was, in essence, the 
same one that had divlded the Voortrekker c o d t i e s ,  at least fmm 
the -time of the N a t d  settlement, if not before. Ihsically, it was 
between the proponents of two opposing systems of govement, the 
one goup  of which demanded a government in which all authori* 
ww lodged in a civil ian and democratically elected Volksmd,  and 
the other w h i c h  wished to institute the autocratic and persona2ized 
government of individual militazy leaders. (20) It was the latter 
form of government which Potgleter and his suppor+ers wished to 
m a i n t a j n  in O h x i e t a d ,  and whlch the gmdudly developing Volksmad 
or N a t a l  parby was seeking t o  bismember. h e  of the principal 
obstacles preventing- the V o ~ ~  party fmm achieving this 
objective was  the Sekwati treaw, for ,  by the terms of W s ,  the 
land occupied by the Ohrigstad settlement was ceded to Pokeeter  Ln 
his personal capacity. 88 a result, in mch the same as his 
Swazi countezpzt to the 80uth, Potgieter could buttress and protect 
his personal supremacy by reference t o  his ownership of the l a d .  
The e a l i e s t  Swazi overbums to +he O h r i g s t a d  comrmznjb 
were therefore a source of considemble embafiassment to Potgieter, 
f o r  they gave grounds f o r  questioning the valfdity of t he  Sekwa5i 
agreement, and supplied his opponents wsith a particularly convenient 
m e a m  of undedning h i 8  authority. He therefore suppressed the 
news of the Swazi envoys (21) aJld they retuned t o  Swaziland empty- 
handed. None the less, Swazi efforts  in W s  direction were not 
entirely fru5tless for, by the end of 1845, the assistace of four 
Beer freebooters, orig5nally f r o m  the Ohrigstad. communi-Gy, had been 
obtahed. (22) The impact of this action on Mswatits opponents was 
immediate a3Ld out of all proportion to their  real significance. F o r  
both MalanbtLe and Mpande the enrolment of these men in Mswatirs 
forces seemed t o  mazk the dawnixg in their comciousmsa of  the 
p o t e n t i d  importance of the Ohrigstad c o m m i t y  in the impendhg 
conflict. hediately,  nessws wexe sent by Npmde, both t o  the 
British au+horities in natal and. to the Ohrigstad 3oers. To -the 
B r i t i s h  he protested about the Boer iatrusion a d  requested that 
they send some men to countemt  the advantage thus gained by the 
Swazi (233, while he urged the Boem to Lmnsfer their settlement 
f m m  the insalubrious area of Ohrigstad to the mre healthy climea 
of Swaziland and t o  expel the Swazi at the same t h e .  (24) But the 
recipients of both these messages were equally suspicious of 
Mpandeg s intentions and ignored his sequests. (25) 
The employment of these Boer mercenaries mw well. have 
conferred a further hidden benefit on the royal p& in Swaziland, 
for there is a stmng likelihood that these men a l s o  supplies the 
Swazi with intelligence about the deep-seated antagonism that 
existed within the Ohrigdad CO-ty. PO-tgieterfa later 
denunciation of their activities indicates that they were adherents 
of the that opposed him in O h r i g t a d  (261, and this in itself 
constitutes fairly strong p m d s  f o r  msmhg that Mswati learmt 
of the  existence of the Volksraad Far% in O h r i g s t a d .  B any case, 
Mswati would probably have soon learnt of these divisions from other 
sources, f o r  the differences between Pofgieter and f i e  VoDsraad 
w e r e  becoming increasingly embittered and mre public, (27) 
The differences between Potgietex and his  opponents which 
arose at the beginning of the settlement mually mounted 5n 
intensity ass .the VoBsmad p& became strengthened (in the first 
h d f  af 1846) by an Mlm of new settlers from R a t d .  For 
obvions reasons, one of the most contentious issues of aJ1 was the 
question o f  the title deeds of the settlement. The Volksraad 
party wished the treaty t o  be renegotiated in  the name of the 
comrmzzlity as a whole and that a payment of some so r t  be made t o  
Sekwati in return fo r  the land. (28) Potgieter was, not 
unnatumlly, opposed t o  any such action, but by Nay 1846 the 
Velksxaad P a t y  was strong enough to go ahead regardless of 
Potgieter 's  opposition, and commissioned David Buija, a man of 
mixed descent, to enter in to  negotiations with Sekwati. Buij~sts 
mission, however, proved abortive. Sekwati wished t o  have no hand 
in the dispute a d  replied that, as he had once given the land t o  
Potgieter, he could not sell i t  again. (29)  
The Volksraad parby recovered suff icient ly quickly from 
this rebuff t o  suggest tha t  even before the departure of  Buija 
they had plmned, in -the event o f  S e h t i  proving unco-operative, 
t o  redirect t h e i r  efforts towar& Swazilafld. How they obtained 
their  infomation about the Swazi claim t o  Sekwatils land, an6 thefr 
willingness -to cede it, cannot now be ascertained but, g5ven the 
comnnulity's iporance  of even the most rudimentary fac ts  about the 
politics of t h i n  area only fom months earlier ( 30), it seems quite 
feasible that they derived this information f r o m  intelligence 
delibemtely transmitted t o  them by the S m z i  king. A t  any mte ,  
jmmediately after the  fa i lwe  of the mission to Sekwati the 
Volksraaid party  directed a pet i t ion  t o  the Polkeraad complaining, 
amongst other things, of Potgietex*~ handling of the question of the 
c o d - b y ' s  t i t l e  to the land and accusing him of suppressing 
information about the Swazi claim to the territory. (31) 
This first o f f i c i a l  mention of the Swmi claim ko -the land 
marked an important deparbwe i n  the policy of the Volksraad party, 
aria also coincided with imporbant new aevelo-pments h SwaziLmd. 
By June khnbu le ,  having secured the support of N p d e ,  was ready 
t o  take active steps in his campaim to us- Mswatirs power. 
While Mpande cal led up half his m for use In Swaailand ( 3 2 ) ,  
Malambule moved his h e a d q d e r s  to the vicinity of Alliaonms 
mission s ta t ion  at Mahamba in southern Swaziland, (33) With -be  
confl ict  now imminent i t  seems likely that  the S w a z i  authorit ies 
redoubled t h e i r  efforts t o  obtain Boer pmtection, and with the new 
receptivity on the p& of the Volksraad party an agreement w a s  
finally reached on 27th July 1846, which ceded to the Boers a l l  the 
t e r r i to ry  bounded by the Oliphants River h the north and the 
CxocodiTe and Elandspruit IZivers in the south. (34) 
The ageement between the S w w i  and the O h r i @ t a d  Boem 
came not a moment too soon. Only six weeks l a t e r ,  in accordance 
with a plan previously amanged with Mpa~sde, Kalambule l e f t  his 
chiefdorn, which was centred, near the Pongola poort, and moved off 
parallel to the Pongola t o  Allisoa~s mimion station. (35) Eere 
he e-d. one of MswatErs d e s  in battle, but waa repulsed and 
fled southwards before the pursuing foxcea i n t o  the  territory of 
L m i b a l e l e  and Phgmondo. ( 3 6 )  This supplied Qande with an 
excuse, for which he had long been waiting, to attack h z i l a n a  
and t o  secure control of some of its more stmtegic area. After 
hiving Mswatifs force out of the land of his (Npandefs) tributaries, 
Epande launched, a f u l l  scale invasion i n t o  Smzi1am.d early in 1847. (37) 
The Zulu f o r c e e  advanced in severss3 independent divisions until they 
reached the Crocodile River. Here they found that mamy Swazi and the 
majoritg of Swazi cattle had taken refuge with the Boers, which thus 
prevented them f r o m  achieving a final victory. (38) For some months 
thereafter a t o t a l  stalemate existed, fox while the Volksmad p& 
could pmtect the S m z i  while they remained close to their settlementsr 
north of the Crocodile River, they could not supply active support 
to expel the Zulu  in Swazlland proper, being at this time virhaally 
on the p o h t  of open hos.bilities with Potgieterts party. (39) It waa 
no* until July 1847 that the Z u l u  a r m ~ y  S M l y  re t i r ed  fmm 
Swaziland (40)~ probably as a result of pressure from the Volksraad 
party. which had by this stage temporarily patched up i t s  differences 
with Potgietex. (5) 
While the influx: of settlers f r o m  Natal and the conclusion 
of the treaty af July a i w l e d  the beginning of the gradual eclipse 
of Potgieterfs p- in O h r i g s t a d ,  it w w  some Lime before this 
became suXficiently pronounced fa induce h k  to marc;h a w  f r o m  
O h r i g a t a d  far mod, to form a new settlement to the north, In the 
meantime, he tried t o  re-establish his fomer authority. A good 
deal of attention has been devoted elsewhere to illustrating his 
efforts to do t h i s  by his manipulation of' white interests. (42) none, 
however, has been paid t o  his attempts t o  manipulate African 
htemsts. Ollly the vaguest reports axe to be found in the official 
records of the Tmnsvaal t o  document his a t t q t s  to enlist the 
suppod of the Afr ica  chiefdom t o  the north and west of Ohrigstad 
in this venture, (43) As regards his negotiations with the S m i ,  
there is, however, a sli&tly better record. PoSgieter had ePery 
reason f o r  making a special. effort  ~5th the Swazi. The V o l k s d  
parby in Ohrigstad remained his most irreconcilable e n q  in .the 
Tmsvaal, a d  much of the au-khoritg of their position depended on 
the Swazi weement of July 1846. It was therefore clearly in his 
interests t o  a t t e m p t  t o  sabotage t h i s  mement  and cas t  doubt on 
I t s  authenticiw, and this he appazently attempted t o  do in the 
latter past; of 1847 or the b e g h v h g  of 1848, when he t r i ed  t o  
induce the Swazi leaders to repudiate their agmsement with the 
V o l k s d .  (44) 
Ebr a number of reasons it is very difficult to gauge the 
e n c t  measme of his success. The evidence of this attempt ever 
having been made comes f m m  a transcript of an interview between 
representatives of the Volkaraad and enwys fmm Somquba ( p m b a b ~ )  
in June 1848 (45)* and if the Swazf did make any agreement with 
Potgietex it is unlikely h 5  they would have revealed it here. 
Probably the most satisfactory interpretation of the events referred 
t o  in this document is that the %azi had been keeping their options 
open with both parties until the situation clarified i t ae l f ,  l e w  
Potgieter on to that they did net recognize the cerjlsion as 
valid, and later rejecting eruch idea when meeting with the 
Volksraad represrentativea. 
One further possible explanation of the ambiguities of the 
btemiew of June 1846 is the fact5onalism which was b e g h u n g  to 
d e ~ e l o p  once more h the internal pol i t ics  of Swazilmd. A t  the 
centre of this was Mstratirs eldest brother, Somquba. Althom 
there i s  no absolutely clinching evidence, it seem likely that 
Somquba was the leading figme in securing the cession of July 
1846. In the reim of his father, Sobuza, he had led at least one 
major eqedit ion into -the eastern Transvaal (against Phiring, the 
mountain fortress of the Pedi chief, ~ekwati) (461, and shortly 
dter  Sobuzars death he was installed in the mi l ikzy  village of 
Eludlambedwiri (see map) and p l x e d  h chase of a large area of 
the eastern Transvaal. (47') E s  special responsibilities in this 
azea therefolpe made h h  an obvious figure to use in the trea* 
negotiation=, f r o m  the point of view of both. the VolZra& and S m a i  
authorities. The fact that hi& tra8 the p r i n c i p d  name appended t o  
the treaty, a d  that he was d e s i w t e d  therein ars 'Wing in place 
of the K i n g t '  lends further wei&t t o  this, (48) 
The designation F1ruling- in place of the Kingtf indeed . 
indicates rather more than Somqubats premier role in securing the 
L846 agreement, f o r  it a lso  sham that withkn a very short  tjme of 
Malambulets rebellion he had succeeded in arrogating t o  himself the 
full mnge of powers previously exercised by Malambule, and it 
s e a s  very probable that it was only his special relationship w i t h  
the Boers and the influence he derived from it in t h i s  time of 
crisis that enabled him t o  achieve such a dominant position. 
k the leas perilous d a p  fol lowing the withdmwaJ. o f  the 
Zulu m, Somquba Pound his leading role h Swazi affairs less 
assured, It soon became appaxrent that at least some S m i  were 
loath t o  accept the f i d i t y  of the 1845 cession, and before long a 
p a r e  seems to have gmwn up there which questioned i t s  en tbe  
vdidi%.  (493 Mether the opposition here eqressed was t o  the 
cession or to i t a  chief architect, Somquba, is a moot point. 
Certainly, my opponent of Somquba would have opposed the cession, 
and t h i s  suggests the possibility that Mswatf, at least privately, 
may have encoumged the pm* that was apposed t o  it. There wexe, 
in amy case, other factors  w h i c h  mf&t have fostered a belief in 
the possible success of a repudiation of the ag~eement. (50)  
Potgieterps attempt to undelmine it from the Boer side would 
obviously have had this effect, as would the viaible weakening of 
the Boer community at Ohrigstad. There the te r r iQhgly  E& dedh 
toll of ita humid and fever-ridden valleysr was both depleting the 
ranlrs of the settlers already there and discowmgtng others from 
fill* up the gaps in thei r  mdcs.  (51) 
Any though5s entertained by Mswatf f s pazty of 
repudiating the agreement v d s h e d  w i t h  the departure of Potgieter 
and his disgruntled followers from Ohrigstad t o h  the middle of 
1848. Wow such repuaation could only h i v e  the Boers i n t o  
Smqubaf S camp, and the only sensible course of action f o r  those 
loyal to Mswati  was to reaffim the legality of the cession asd 
t o  try t o  detach the Boers From Somquba" interests. Somguba, for 
his p&, seemEl to have been encoumged t o  act even more 
independently, and relations between the twa took a rapid turn for 
the worsre. (52) The traditional version of theae events makes 
clear how seriously Smquba was challenging Mswai;irs authori-ty at 
this time. Nuch earlier, when Somquba had been installed at the 
Eludlambedwhi village in the eastern !hamvaal, he had 'been @ven 
cWge of LuUanbedlu catt le .  (53) This was an important chszge, far 
the LudlambeU cattle had considerable ritual and aymbolic 
importance f o r  the S m i ,  occupying a cent- role h the annual. 
i n c w d a  or first fruits ceremony. (54) ThLs incwala ceremony was, 
and still is, the mast imgor tan t  event in the traditional S m i  
cdendaz. The p d i c i p a t i o n  of the nation in ri tes  gives physical 
and symbolic exgression of the unity of the nation, as represented . 
by the King, while its. central purpose is the strengkheninpy a~ld 
renewal of the nation aa embodied in the King. (55) Because of the 
centraJ i q o r t a n c e  of this ceremony my slight to its r i t a  p m  
eminence, e.g. the failure of a subordinate cMef to send proper 
repxesentativea to attend it, or the dancing by a subord3nate chief 
of his own incwala dance, constituted p x h  facie evidence of 
treasonable intent. (56)  Thus, when Somquba refused at about this 
time to relinquish the Ludlambedlu cattle (573, he must have done so 
in full h o w l e w  of the enomi*  of his act, aware that this 
constituted a direct chdlenge t o  Mswatits authority. 
The f W  stages of the dispute can be charted f m m  
contemporarg records. Bg August 1848 Somquba evidently already 
f e m d  an attack f r o m  his brother, f o r  in this month he w-m the 
source of  a rumour among the Ohrigtaders that a farce of EZswatirs, 
which was in the f i e l d ,  was on i t s  wag t o  attack Field Kone t  de 
Beer. (58) Evidently Somqvba either feared an attack on hhself by 
this force, and hoped that a mobilization of the Boer forces mu3.d 
de-her it, or, alternatively, he may simply have been trying to foster 
mspicion and ill-feeling between Mswati and the Boem, in the 
expectation of such an attack in the near fiture. In September 
Sornquba was once q p i m  the e o m e  of a report that Mswati  had sent 
ta M c u s a  (otherwise laom as sodmqpne)  to suggest that thc two 
E h g s  undertake a joint attack on the Boers ( 5 9 ) ,  and by December 
relations between Mswati and Somquba had, detericrmted to such ara 
extent that each W sending messengers to the h d d r o s t  at 
Bugmdmp to protest  t -the misdemeanours of the other. (60) 
It must have been at about this time that Mswatf finally sent an 
m to attack Somquba. (61) Swoqubw, however, managed to repulse 
this at a battle in the region of the Romati Rlver, and fled to the 
protection of the Ohrigsbd Buers, under whom he was to shelter 
safely f o r  the next four  yeam. (62) 
The protection extended by the Ohrigstad Boem t o  Somquba 
could not have come entirely as a surprise to Mswati and his advise=, 
f o r  Smqubaas specid relationship with them a;na his p m x m t y  to 
their settlemen+ had made t h i s  a potential hazard. ever since the 
f i r s t  doubts came to be f e l t  about MS loyalty. For some time b e f o r e  
the final rupture between the two brothers there were ind&cations that 
&wati and h i s  advisera had concluded that they could not rely on even 
the n e u t d i w ,  still leas the eupport, o f  the Boers in m y  future 
conflict with Somquba. Thw, towards the end of 1849 or the be- 
of  1850, the S m i  sent messengers t o  N a t a l  with a view both to 
securing an altenzati~e meam of rest- Zulu attacks and in the 
hope that the British m i @ t  exert Wuence t o  prevent the Ners 
openly supporting Somquba @st %wati. ( 6  3) A+ approximately the 
same time overhres seem also to have been made t o  Manirmsa, %ho@ 
whether these were d i r e c t l y  connected w i t h  t h e  Somquba dispute is less 
W-t until these diplomtic  Wtiastives showed some ai@s 
of success Mswati was still interested in preventing relatians 
with the Boers from lapsing i n t o  open h o s t i l i Q .  A p d  f r o m  
Somqubats defection, which done l o s t  EZsmti 500 fligbting' men [ 65 ) ,  
at least one ather major chief rebelled against Mswati in the interc 
mediate period. This t7as Mgazi, head of the b e k o  chiefdm. 
The Naseke had been one of the p r i n c i p d  chiefdoma in bentral 
SwaziLand prior t o  the entry of Sobmars m g w a n e  (661, and 
altho- they had subordimted themselves t o  Sobuza they had, like 
so many other v ~ z a m b i 3 e 1 r  chiefdorns, retained a lazge measure of 
local. autonomy, Kswat i% seammes of centmJization had, however, 
steadily encroached upon this, and one of these measwes rankled 
particularly, This waa the "gift" by Msmti o f  one of his sisters 
to be w i r s  bride, f a r  thia automatically compelled the k e k o  t o  
install her as the chief wife of Mgazi, and thus as the mother of 
hTs prospective heir. (67) It m none the less only the removal 
of H s d i ' s  capital from the m b a  to Hob that revealed the 
extent of the Masekofs discontent, fox now, in the wake of the Z u l u  
invasion, m d  with Ksk~at i ra  authoxi* far more distant than before, 
they felt in a posi t ion t o  reassert themselves, and supplanted 
Lambobota (albeit in a very sub rosa fashion) ~ 5 t h  a wife fm the  
N d z h d z e  lineage, which traditionally had provided %he chief 
wives of the Maseko. Mgazits defiance did not last long. Mswati 
imediately despatched a force t o  destroy him, and my chance of 
auccess that he mi@t have had it was destroyed when a 
port ion of his people sided with the attacking Swazi fo rce .  He was 
therefore compelled to flee t o  the TranavaaJ with a remat of his 
people, ( 6 8 )  
hteraa l  disturbances on this scale inevitably attracted 
-be  attention of the Zulu King, Mpande, and i t  seems tha t  it was 
%he expectation of this, together with uncertain* m t o  the 
ability ox desire of the British to restrah him, which led Mswati 
to maintain at Least a veatigid relationship with the Boers. (69)  
The Zulu raid that Mswati feared finally materialized a;t the end 
of 1849 ( T O ) ,  only three months after Plgazirs f l ight ,  arid at almost 
exactly the same time as Somqubars rebellion. Fortunately, in 
consequence of some in4mma.l wrangling about the despatch of W s  
m, i ts numbers were not as large as they m i & t  have been (71), 
and only one of Msmtirs maAn towns was destroyed. None the less, 
p m  or not, the m i d  was a clear m of what Mmati mi&t 
expect in the winters ahead if he could not find some means of 
inducing the Zulus to desist. 
The presence of Somquba effectively precluded agy 10- 
tern co-operation with the Oh5gstad Republic, f o r  Mswati was more 
o r  less bound to attempt before long to dispose of this threat t o  
his future safe*. The N a t a l  authorities f o r  their park were 
almost entirely ineffectual. When Mswati sent messages to them 
a s k i n g  them to intervene to preven-k any further Zulu raids, d l  
they could recommend w w  that Mswati try and seek some accommodatfon 
with Mpande, even if it meant going t o  the le&hs of bec- 
tributary to m. (72) 
Ultimately, this was what, Kswati was compelled to do (73), 
and f o r  a time a f ' t e ~  this  the balance of power of aouth-amtern Africa 
was revolutionized. For the &em, the alliance which they had 80 
feazed im the very earliest days of the Ohrigstad nettlemeat suddenly 
materialized, and i t s  effects were almost Wediately dlsmtmus for 
thm. In August 1850 a commission which s e t  out t b u &  Smzi  
territory t o  supemise the making of a road was ~ i r h a l l y  harried out 
of S m z i l a d  by &mti (741, while a year later the Boer Republic 
found itself suddenly engulfed by a Zulu anqy attacking the Pedri chief, 
Selcwati. (75) Moreover, a Swazi attack was clearly t o  be expected 
soon on Somquba, whom the k e r s  were, rin theory, committed t o  protect. 
Before this could happen, however, the prejudices of a generation 
reasserted themselves: a new fispute arose between Mpande and Msmti, 
and Npandels armies once win invaded Swaziland. (76 )  
The Zulu invasion of 1852 marks something of a watershed 
In h z i  E s t o r g .  Because of i n t e e  Zulu divisions th i s  w a s  to be 
the last major Zulu ra id  experienced by the Swazi. As a result, 
Mswati was able h L855 finally to diepose of Somquba, and the 
remainder of his reign was free from either domestic challenge or 
e x t e m d  threat. Henceforth, he wa.~ in a posi t ion t o  concentmte 
his  energies on expanding his influence both at home and abmad. 
Internally, he consolidated the D l a m i n i  hegemony by eliminating even 
the mast remote threads of D l a m i n i  supremacy. Ektemdly, he 
expanded his influence to the north, east and west, both by conquest 
and. by pushing forward militw villages i n t o  land earlier ceded to 
the Boers. Swaeiland was not, of course, t o  remain free from 
internal disputes in the reiggs of his successors, and these 
undoubtedly made a considerable impact on external relations, But 
by the end. of Kswa-ki~s reign Swaziland was a far more cohesive 
p o l i t i c d .  u n i t  than it had been at the time of Hswati's accession, 
and the disputes which followed did not have the same deb i l i t a t ing  
effect as those of earlier ye-. The external. position, moreover, 
lacked the fluidi* which had characterized the early years of white 
settlement, and this compounded the movement to&s w a t e r  in te rna l  
cohesion h S w m i l a d .  Now xi& factions in Swaziland were 
compelled t o   leek their  alliances among the opposing gmups of white 
concessionajma within S w a z i l d ,  and this caused a real in 
%he character of Swazi external policy. Henceforth, it gradually 
became less less a meas whereb one Swazi faction could 
subordinate another zYld more and more an expression of which Swazj. 
faction had already at ta ined supremacy over the others. 31 short, 
what we m observing here is the gradual curtailment of the process 
of fission W c h  had chamcterized the e a l y  yeam of both Boer and 
Swazi communities, and the emergence i n  each of a more distinctively 
national fosejgn policy. 
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It is w o r h  makbg  %he p o h k  here that a;lly h z i  repudiation 
of the treaty would aJmost c e ~ ~  not have been done by a 
dmmatic proclamation t o  -the Tolkssaad parby, but by df;o&her 
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&host cer-liain that he 9s one and +he same, f o r  t a t i o n  
relates that Mgazi f led to the 'Pranavad, M l e  fTCkncaasft 
would scascely have been worthy of mention in the o f f i c i a l  
records if he were not a subo+te chief of Mswa-kifs. 
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